Moral action and Teleology in Kant's Philosophy

• Grant number: 14/21012-0
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Master
• Start date: February 01, 2015
• End date: February 29, 2016
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - Ethics
• Agreement: Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES)
• Principal Investigator: Paulo Roberto Licht dos Santos
• Grantee: João Paulo Rissi
• Host Institution: Centro de Educação e Ciências Humanas (CECH). Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCAR). São Carlos , SP, Brazil

Abstract

Immanuel Kant, in groundwork of the Metaphysics of morals, says that an action is not good for the end it wishes to pursue, but only by the act of willing itself. It is from the intent of the action we derive their moral value and not from a predetermined purpose. This conception, supported by a teleological theory, will be suppressed in the groundwork, since the action is determined by mere rational principle (i.e, the will as determined by the moral law) alone is enough to judge an act as moral. I mean: the action, according to Kant, is good for a rational principle, that is, which is determined independently of any end that is assumed to reach. However, in a curious passage of groundwork, we note the following: "... the true destination [Bestimmung] of the same (reason) must be to produce a good will, certainly not as a means to view something else, but rather in itself - for what reason was absolutely necessary. "(Kant, 2009, p. 113). Now, if earlier, Kant had away, at first at least, a teleological approach to his moral theory at the expense of action that determines how good the mere rational principle, and therefore does not require the effective realization of the end to have moral value, now, Kant makes use of the concept destination to refer to the ultimate end of reason. This destination, i.e, the ultimate end of reason be to produce a good will. So, ultimately, the extent to which Kant - even having abolished the concept of Teleology of his moral theory - would, in fact, since opening precisely this concept left out on a first moment? Therefore, it is plausible to interpret the kantian moral teleological way through the concept of Bestimmung? Thus, we will, from that point, investigate whether the destination (Bestimmung) involves a teleological conception and, from there, if there is any place for other forms of Teleology in Kant's moral. (AU)