This research aims at comparing the regulatory arrangements established in the monetary-financial sector of Latin American countries. The purpose is to assess to what extent some of the region's major economies have converged towards the adoption of global "technologies" of regulation. From the 1990s, two simultaneous types of regulatory transplants have affected these countries. The first one refers to the diffusion of a particular kind of state architecture, according to which regulatory independence prevails over regulatory politicization. The second transplant refers to the diffusion of banking supervision rules, those ones stipulated by the Basle Accords. The ideal type resulting from these simultaneous transplants would be the establishment of a Regulatory State, based on a politically independent central bank and linked to internationally convergent regulatory rules. In spite of this, some evidence suggests that the regulatory transplants have encountered different local institutional translations. Recent works on regulatory reforms point to different modes and degrees of regulatory convergence. The purpose of this research is to verify to what extent the double institutional transplant has shaped the institutional and regulatory designs of Latin American countries. The study will evaluate the qualitative result of the national reforms in two axes of analysis. The first refers to the architecture of the state and compares the content of discretion or political insulation reserved for governments in monetary-financial regulation. The second axis turns to regulatory tools and contrasts countries' level of convergence with global regulatory tools. The paper will analyze the institutional and regulatory designs of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, which are the largest economies in the region.
News published in Agência FAPESP Newsletter about the scholarship: