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Judicial control of mandates: the Brazilian Supreme Court and federal Congress members (1988-2022)

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Author(s):
Gabriela Fischer Armani
Total Authors: 1
Document type: Master's Dissertation
Press: São Paulo.
Institution: Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD)
Defense date:
Examining board members:
Rogério Bastos Arantes; Luciano da Ros; Matthew MacLeod Taylor
Advisor: Rogério Bastos Arantes
Abstract

Under what conditions do courts control the exercise of political activity? While democracies often provide checks on mandates in the political arena, they can also come from the courts, generating tensions, altering the balance of power in Congress, and imposing popularity costs. Search and seizure, activity restrictions, suspensions, loss of mandates, and even the imprisonment of politicians have been on the agenda of the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF). This research maps the court\'s decisions on federal parliamentary mandates (1988-2022) and seeks to explain the incentives and constraints that influence them. I investigate the hypothesis that external conditions to the court influence the judicial alteration of the parliamentary status quo - political legitimation and episodes of corruption. I present a typology and novel data regarding control measures decided by the STF against representatives. Mandate control involves criminal, electoral, and parliamentary cases and has evolved in four cycles. To test the hypothesis, variables related to political competition, ties to corruption processes, control sphere, the severity of measures, party coalition, and the affected individuals\' office are mobilized. The evidence allows me to affirm that the court\'s frequency of mandate control and the likelihood of effectively altering the status quo are sensitive to these conditions, reinforcing the explanatory potential of the hypothesis. The research covers the topic\'s normative, judicial, and legislative dimensions. The results show that the control of mandates by the STF benefits from broad and vague normative predictions and has been a tool in the competition for positions mobilized by politicians and parties for over fifteen years. Major corruption episodes, by promoting public support for control decisions - a valuable opportunity for the realignment of political forces - become a favorable moment for the convergence of external factors that restrict mandates. Thus, I argue that the STF and its justices have acted strategically on this issue. Control, in turn, is sensitive to the strategic manner in which Congress members and parties use and react to this judicial attribution. The empirical tests also indicate that electoral and criminal processes are more likely to host control measures than cases from the parliamentary sphere. Less severe measures are more likely to be imposed than others, and senators are less likely to be subject to control than federal deputies. Finally, a difference-in-differences model indicates that the STF has become more inclined to impose restrictive measures after the Lava Jato operation, demonstrating that the operation was a turning point for the phenomenon: it inaugurated a pattern of mandate control that has persisted even after its decline and is not exclusive to episodes of corruption. (AU)

FAPESP's process: 20/03622-6 - The Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal Interference in the exercise of political offices
Grantee:Gabriela Fischer Armani
Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Master