| Texto completo | |
| Autor(es): |
Nakano, Anderson Luis
Número total de Autores: 1
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| Tipo de documento: | Artigo Científico |
| Fonte: | Kriterion; v. 61, n. 145, p. 23-pg., 2020-01-01. |
| Resumo | |
In a recent essay, Soren Stenlund tries to align Wittgenstein's approach to the foundations and nature of mathematics with the tradition of symbolic mathematics. The characterization of symbolic mathematics made by Stenlund, according to which mathematics is logically separated from its external applications, brings it closer to the formalist position. This raises naturally the question whether Wittgenstein holds a formalist position in philosophy of mathematics. The aim of this paper is to give a negative answer to this question, defending the view that Wittgenstein always thought that there is no logical separation between mathematics and its applications. I will focus on Wittgenstein remarks about arithmetic during his middle period, because it is in this period that a formalist reading of his writings is most tempting. I will show how his idea of autonomy of arithmetic is not to be compared with the formalist idea of autonomy, according to which a calculus is "cut off" from its applications. The autonomy of arithmetic, according to Wittgenstein. guarantees its own applicability, thus providing its own raison d'etre. (AU) | |
| Processo FAPESP: | 15/25646-6 - Os comentários de wittgenstein sobre o teorema de gödel |
| Beneficiário: | Anderson Luis Nakano |
| Modalidade de apoio: | Bolsas no Brasil - Pós-Doutorado |