| Texto completo | |
| Autor(es): |
Schimit, P. H. T.
[2]
Número total de Autores: 1
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| Afiliação do(s) autor(es): | [1] Schimit, P. H. T., Univ Nove Julho, Informat \& Knowledge Management Grad Program, Rua Vergueiro 235-249, BR-05001001 Sao Paulo, SP, Brazil.Sergio, A. R., Univ Nove Julho, Informat & Knowledge Management Grad Program, Rua Vergueiro 235-249, BR-05001001 Sao Paulo, SP - Brazil
Número total de Afiliações: 1
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| Tipo de documento: | Artigo Científico |
| Fonte: | ECOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY; v. 42, MAR 2020. |
| Citações Web of Science: | 0 |
| Resumo | |
Evolutionary games usually take into consideration individuals' strategies as the transformative characteristic which leads to the evolution of the population. Here, besides the strategies, interaction aspects are also considered as evolutionary attributes which can change over time as the replacement dynamic renovates the population choosing locally better individuals to reproduce. The population is modeled by cellular automata, interactions by the Prisoner's Dilemma game and the replacement process is ruled by two versions of death-birth dynamic. Although the average payoff per game is considered as the fitness for choosing better individuals, the number of games per time step and a maximum radius of interaction with neighbours are also present in the individual's chromosome which is passed to the next generation. Numerical simulations show that individual interaction properties and cooperation level are linked to the version of death-birth dynamic used and the game payoff. For instance, when the fitness bias is on the death event, individuals have more interactions in a larger radius, and the cooperation level is usually lower than the case where the fitness bias is on the birth event. Also, the individuals' interaction profiles are heterogeneous, and cooperative individuals form clusters in the lattice to protect themselves. (AU) | |
| Processo FAPESP: | 17/12671-8 - Laboratório de dinâmicas populacionais |
| Beneficiário: | Pedro Henrique Triguis Schimit |
| Modalidade de apoio: | Auxílio à Pesquisa - Regular |