| Texto completo | |
| Autor(es): |
Marques, Beatriz Sorrentino
;
Pessoa, Osvaldo Frota, Jr.
Número total de Autores: 2
|
| Tipo de documento: | Artigo Científico |
| Fonte: | COGNITIVE SYSTEMS RESEARCH; v. 43, p. 8-pg., 2017-06-01. |
| Resumo | |
Well-known theories of Agent Causation rely on a conception of agency that expects that agents play a role in the production of their action, a conscious role. According to this conception of agents, the requirement of consciousness provides ground for these theories to pose the Disappearing Agent objection to the Causal Theory of Action. In a similar way, Wegner (2002) holds that without the conscious will playing a role in the production of actions we are not agents. In this sense, the elements that ground the Disappearing Agent objection resemble Wegner's conclusion that it is an illusion that we are agents. I will argue that the objection raised by Agent Causation theories equates lack of consciousness with lack of control and, consequently, of agential role in the production of action. This will show that the issue is grounded on a specific conception of what an agent is, and what her role in producing actions should be. I, however, defend the claim that this conception of agency should be revised, as well as the objection that springs from it, because if we accept that consciousness does not always play a relevant role in the production of actions, then human agents cannot fulfill the requirements in question. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. (AU) | |
| Processo FAPESP: | 14/02558-1 - Intenções conscientes e a concepção do agente |
| Beneficiário: | Beatriz Sorrentino Marques |
| Modalidade de apoio: | Bolsas no Exterior - Estágio de Pesquisa - Doutorado |
| Processo FAPESP: | 11/21030-0 - O agente apagado: o papel do agente nas explicações de ações e como o raciocínio prático pode ajudar na sua compreensão |
| Beneficiário: | Beatriz Sorrentino Marques |
| Modalidade de apoio: | Bolsas no Brasil - Doutorado |