Um esquema de mobilidade na votação para as eleições Brasileiras

• Processo: 25/11403-6
• Modalidade de apoio: Bolsas no Exterior - Estágio de Pesquisa - Doutorado
• Data de Início da vigência: 01 de abril de 2026
• Data de Término da vigência: 31 de março de 2027
• Área de conhecimento: Ciências Exatas e da Terra - Ciência da Computação - Sistemas de Computação
• Pesquisador responsável: Marcos Antonio Simplicio Junior
• Beneficiário: Leonardo Toshinobu Kimura
• Supervisor: Diego de Freitas Aranha
• Instituição Sede: Escola Politécnica (EP). Universidade de São Paulo (USP). São Paulo , SP, Brasil
• Instituição Anfitriã: Aarhus University, Dinamarca
• Vinculado à bolsa: 24/06106-0 - Mobilidade na votação para as eleições brasileiras, BP.DR
• Assunto(s): Criptologia Eleições (processo político)
• Palavra(s)-Chave do Pesquisador: Criptografia | Eleições | mobilidade na votação | verificabilidade | votos duplos | Criptografia

Resumo

Even though voting is compulsory in Brazil, the country suffers from significant abstention rates, an issue that may potentially harm the government's legitimacy. One way to increase voter participation is by facilitating the electoral process itself. In Brazil, for example, voters must vote exclusively at designated polling places, which often results in long commutes, especially for those who are traveling or have recently relocated. One promising solution is the ``anywhere voting" solutions, which essentially allow voters to cast their votes in any polling station. However, implementing the anywhere voting concept presents significant challenges, particularly concerning the need to prevent double voting. While many countries address this issue simply by employing electronic poll books connected to the Internet, this approach is vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks. In addition, they are not suitable for remote places with poor connectivity (and even electricity) infrastructure, which are not uncommon in Brazil. Therefore, this research aims to develop an anywhere voting scheme suitable for the adversarial context of Brazil. We require the solution to be verifiable and protect vote privacy and integrity, despite the high risks of impersonation, denial-of-service, and vote-buying attacks. Meanwhile, we seek to ensure verifiability, vote privacy, and integrity properties, despite the high risks of impersonation, denial-of-service, and vote-buying attacks. We also require the solution to be resistant to quantum computers, avoiding store-now-decrypt-later attacks. (AU)