| Texto completo | |
| Autor(es): |
Número total de Autores: 2
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| Afiliação do(s) autor(es): | [1] Univ Calif Irvine, Dept Log & Philosophy Sci, Irvine, CA 92697 - USA
[2] Univ Estadual Campinas, Ctr Log Epistemol & Hist Sci, Campinas - Brazil
Número total de Afiliações: 2
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| Tipo de documento: | Artigo Científico |
| Fonte: | PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES; v. 178, n. 2 MAR 2020. |
| Citações Web of Science: | 0 |
| Resumo | |
In a recent paper, Pruss (Can J Philos 43:430-437, 2013) proves the validity of the rule beta-2 relative to Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals, which is a significant step forward in the debate about the consequence argument. Yet, we believe there remain intuitive counter-examples to beta-2 formulated with the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. We offer a novel and two-dimensional formulation of the Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals and prove the validity of a new transfer rule according to which a new version of the consequence argument can be formulated. This new transfer rule is immune to the counter-examples involving the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. However, we show that counter-examples to this new rule can also be generated, demanding that the Lewisian semantics be generalized for higher dimensions where counter-examples can always be generated. (AU) | |
| Processo FAPESP: | 17/20532-8 - Libertismo disposicional: esboço de uma teoria disposicional sobre leis da natureza e livre-arbítrio |
| Beneficiário: | Pedro Merlussi |
| Modalidade de apoio: | Bolsas no Brasil - Pós-Doutorado |