A Timing Attack on the HQC Encryption Scheme

Autor(es)

Paiva, Thales Bandiera ; Terada, Routo ; Paterson, KG ; Stebila, D

• Tipo de documento: Artigo Científico
• Fonte: SELECTED AREAS IN CRYPTOGRAPHY - SAC 2019; v. 11959, p. 23-pg., 2020-01-01.

Resumo

The HQC public-key encryption scheme is a promising code-based submission to NIST's post-quantum cryptography standardization process. The scheme is based on the decisional decoding problem for random quasi-cyclic codes. One problem of the HQC's reference implementation submitted to NIST in the first round of the standardization process is that the decryption operation is not constant-time. In particular, the decryption time depends on the number of errors decoded by a BCH decoder. We use this to present the first timing attack against HQC. The attack is practical, requiring the attacker to record the decryption time of around 400 million ciphertexts for a set of HQC parameters corresponding to 128 bits of security. This makes the use of constant-time decoders mandatory for the scheme to be considered secure. (AU)

• Processo FAPESP: 14/50937-1 - INCT 2014: da Internet do Futuro
• Beneficiário: Fabio Kon
• Modalidade de apoio: Auxílio à Pesquisa - Temático
• Processo FAPESP: 15/24485-9 - Internet do futuro aplicada a cidades inteligentes
• Beneficiário: Fabio Kon
• Modalidade de apoio: Auxílio à Pesquisa - Temático