On some common objections to a behavioral approach to psychological categories

Autor(es)

Lazzeri, Filipe

• Tipo de documento: Artigo Científico
• Fonte: PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY; v. 29, n. 3, p. 405-418, APR 2 2016.
• Citações Web of Science: 0

Resumo

This paper addresses several objections that have been leveled against a behavioral approach to psychological categories. It reconstructs and critically assesses (a) the so-called causal objection; (b) alleged counterexamples whereby one can exhibit the typical behaviors associated with a psychological phenomenon without exhibiting the latter, including Lewis' ``perfect actor{''} case and Kirk's ``zombie{''}; (c) alleged counterexamples whereby organisms can exemplify psychological phenomena without exhibiting any behavior associated with them, including Armstrong's imagined brain in a vat, Putnam's ``super-super-spartans{''} scenario, and related cases; and (d) the holistic objection. Mistaken assumptions in each of these objections are pinpointed. The paper starts with a brief characterization of behaviorism about psychological categories and a summary of the particular version thereof supported here, which draws upon Ryle and Skinner, among others. (AU)

• Processo FAPESP: 12/00059-2 - Predicações psicológicas ordinárias, comportamento e análise do comportamento
• Beneficiário: Filipe Lazzeri Vieira
• Modalidade de apoio: Bolsas no Brasil - Doutorado