On some common objections to a behavioral approach to psychological categories

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Author(s):	Lazzeri, Filipe Total Authors: 1
Document type:	Journal article
Source:	PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY; v. 29, n. 3, p. 405-418, APR 2 2016.
Web of Science Citations:	0
Abstract
This paper addresses several objections that have been leveled against a behavioral approach to psychological categories. It reconstructs and critically assesses (a) the so-called causal objection; (b) alleged counterexamples whereby one can exhibit the typical behaviors associated with a psychological phenomenon without exhibiting the latter, including Lewis' ``perfect actor{''} case and Kirk's ``zombie{''}; (c) alleged counterexamples whereby organisms can exemplify psychological phenomena without exhibiting any behavior associated with them, including Armstrong's imagined brain in a vat, Putnam's ``super-super-spartans{''} scenario, and related cases; and (d) the holistic objection. Mistaken assumptions in each of these objections are pinpointed. The paper starts with a brief characterization of behaviorism about psychological categories and a summary of the particular version thereof supported here, which draws upon Ryle and Skinner, among others. (AU)

FAPESP's process:	12/00059-2 - Ordinary psychological Predications, behavior, and analysis of behavior
Grantee:	Filipe Lazzeri Vieira
Support Opportunities:	Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate