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Wittgenstein on Dreaming and Skepticism

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Autor(es):
Segatto, Antonio Ianni
Número total de Autores: 1
Tipo de documento: Artigo Científico
Fonte: TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY; v. 41, n. 5, p. 10-pg., 2022-11-21.
Resumo

In this paper I aim to elucidate Wittgenstein's claim that the so-called dream argument is senseless. Unlike other interpreters, who understand the sentence "I am dreaming" as contradictory or self-defeating, I intend to elucidate in what sense one should understand it as senseless or, more precisely, as nonsensical. In this sense, I propose to understand the above-mentioned claim in light of Wittgenstein's criticism of skepticism from the Tractatus logico-philosophicus to his last writings. I intend to show that the words "I am dreaming" are nonsensical in the same sense as the alleged proposition "There are physical objects" or the expression of doubt about the existence of external objects. (AU)

Processo FAPESP: 19/02290-2 - Wittgenstein e a prática de seguir regras
Beneficiário:Antonio Ianni Segatto
Modalidade de apoio: Bolsas no Exterior - Pesquisa