An argument against nominalism

Autor(es)

Ferrari, Francesco Maria

• Tipo de documento: Artigo Científico
• Fonte: SYNTHESE; v. 200, n. 5, p. 23-pg., 2022-09-22.

Resumo

Nominalism in formal ontology is still the thesis that the only acceptable domain of quantification is the first-order domain of particulars. Nominalists may assert that second-order well-formed formulas can be fully and completely interpreted within the first-order domain, thereby avoiding any ontological commitment to second-order entities, by means of an appropriate semantics called "substitutional". In this paper I argue that the success of this strategy depends on the ability of Nominalists to maintain that identity, and equivalence relations more in general, is first-order and invariant. Firstly, I explain why Nominalists are formally bound to this first-order concept of identity. Secondly, I show that the resources needed to justify identity, a certain conception of identity invariance, are out of the Nominalist's reach. (AU)

• Processo FAPESP: 18/16465-6 - Em Direção de uma Metafisica dos Processos
• Beneficiário: Francesco Maria Ferrari
• Modalidade de apoio: Bolsas no Brasil - Pós-Doutorado