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(Referência obtida automaticamente do SciELO, por meio da informação sobre o financiamento pela FAPESP e o número do processo correspondente, incluída na publicação pelos autores.)

Mandatory Individual Amendments: a Change in the Pattern of Executive Dominance in the Brazilian Budgetary and Financial Cycle

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Autor(es):
Raul Bonfim [1] ; Joyce Hellen Luz [2] ; Vitor Vasquez [3]
Número total de Autores: 3
Afiliação do(s) autor(es):
[1] Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Department of Political Science - Brasil
[2] Universidade de São Paulo. Department of Political Science - Brasil
[3] Universidade Estadual de Santa Cruz. Department of Philosophy and Human Sciences - Brasil
Número total de Afiliações: 3
Tipo de documento: Artigo Científico
Fonte: Brazilian Political Science Review; v. 17, n. 2 2023-06-02.
Resumo

Until 2013, the Brazilian executive branch had control over the execution of all discretionary public spending. In that context, all Brazilian legislators could do was amend the budget proposal prepared by the government. This article analyzes whether EC 86/2015, known as the mandatory budget amendment EC, has reduced executive dominance over the financial cycle of individual budget amendments. To this end, we examine descriptively and inferentially the main changes proposed by EC 86/2015, as well as data about the individual amendments executed before and after the constitutional change. Our results indicate that executive dominance was reduced after the change in the budget execution rules: the amount paid and the number of executed individual amendments have increased, while the profile of legislators with executed amendments also changed: Being part of the government coalition became less important. This article contributes to legislative studies by exploring the empirical implications of this important constitutional change. From a theoretical point of view, our findings challenge the expectation that the executive uses amendment execution as a bargaining tool to secure legislative support in roll-call votes in the National Congress, especially in the post-EC 86/2015 period. (AU)

Processo FAPESP: 18/01513-5 - AGENDA DA COALIZÃO: Um estudo sobre o manejo das coalizões no presidencialismo brasileiro
Beneficiário:Joyce Hellen Luz
Modalidade de apoio: Bolsas no Brasil - Doutorado
Processo FAPESP: 18/00013-9 - Recrutamento para as comissões no Brasil
Beneficiário:Vitor Lacerda Vasquez
Modalidade de apoio: Bolsas no Exterior - Estágio de Pesquisa - Doutorado