| Texto completo | |
| Autor(es): |
Coniglio, Marcelo Esteban
;
da Cruz Silvestrini, Luiz Henrique
Número total de Autores: 2
|
| Tipo de documento: | Artigo Científico |
| Fonte: | LOGIC JOURNAL OF THE IGPL; v. 22, n. 2, p. 24-pg., 2014-04-01. |
| Resumo | |
In 1986, Mikenberg et al. introduced the semantic notion of quasi-truth defined by means of partial structures. In such structures, the predicates are seen as triples of pairwise disjoint sets: the set of tuples which satisfies, does not satisfy and can satisfy or not the predicate, respectively. The syntactical counterpart of the logic of partial truth is a rather complicated first-order modal logic. In the present article, the notion of predicates as triples is recursively extended, in a natural way, to any complex formula of the first-order object language. From this, a new definition of quasi-truth is obtained. The proof-theoretic counterpart of the new semantics is a first-order paraconsistent logic whose propositional base is a 3-valued logic belonging to hierarchy of paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency, which was proposed by Carnielli and Marcos in 2002. (AU) | |
| Processo FAPESP: | 10/51038-0 - Logical consequence, reasoning and computation - LOGCONS |
| Beneficiário: | Walter Alexandre Carnielli |
| Modalidade de apoio: | Auxílio à Pesquisa - Temático |