| Texto completo | |
| Autor(es): |
Thorpe, Joshua Rowan
Número total de Autores: 1
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| Tipo de documento: | Artigo Científico |
| Fonte: | PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES; v. 176, n. 9, p. 2289-2306, SEP 2019. |
| Citações Web of Science: | 0 |
| Resumo | |
Putnam's vat argument is intended to show that I am not a permanently envatted brain. The argument holds promise as a response to vat scepticism, which depends on the claim that I do not know that I am not a permanently envatted brain. However, there is a widespread idea that the vat argument cannot fulfil this promise, because to employ the argument as a response to vat scepticism I would have to make assumptions about the content of the premises and/or conclusion of the argument that beg the question against the sceptic. In this paper, I show that this idea is mistaken. (AU) | |
| Processo FAPESP: | 16/03277-1 - Ceticismo e Primeira Pessoa |
| Beneficiário: | Joshua Rowan Thorpe |
| Modalidade de apoio: | Bolsas no Brasil - Pós-Doutorado |