| Full text | |
| Author(s): |
Thorpe, Joshua Rowan
Total Authors: 1
|
| Document type: | Journal article |
| Source: | PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES; v. 176, n. 9, p. 2289-2306, SEP 2019. |
| Web of Science Citations: | 0 |
| Abstract | |
Putnam's vat argument is intended to show that I am not a permanently envatted brain. The argument holds promise as a response to vat scepticism, which depends on the claim that I do not know that I am not a permanently envatted brain. However, there is a widespread idea that the vat argument cannot fulfil this promise, because to employ the argument as a response to vat scepticism I would have to make assumptions about the content of the premises and/or conclusion of the argument that beg the question against the sceptic. In this paper, I show that this idea is mistaken. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 16/03277-1 - Skepticism and The First Person |
| Grantee: | Joshua Rowan Thorpe |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Post-Doctoral |