| Texto completo | |
| Autor(es): |
Martone, Filipe
Número total de Autores: 1
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| Tipo de documento: | Artigo Científico |
| Fonte: | ANALYSIS; v. N/A, p. 9-pg., 2022-11-01. |
| Resumo | |
The issue of whether a theory of demonstratives should be able to handle Frege's Puzzle seems rather old hat, but it was not so much resolved as left hanging. This paper tries to remedy that. I argue that a major problem not previously noticed affects any theory of demonstratives that aims at dealing with Frege's Puzzle. This problem shows itself in cases in which the cognitive significance of a single demonstrative identity - such as 'that is that' - differs for participants of the same context. To accommodate such cases, I argue, we would need an implausible individualistic theory of demonstratives nobody should (or does) endorse. If so, we must look elsewhere for a solution to Frege's Puzzle. (AU) | |
| Processo FAPESP: | 13/22364-4 - Semântica e valor cognitivo |
| Beneficiário: | Filipe Martone de Faria |
| Modalidade de apoio: | Bolsas no Brasil - Mestrado |