Coercion in Disguise? A Reassessment of Brazilian Education and Health Reforms

Autor(es)

Schlegel, Rogerio ^[1] ; Vazquez, Daniel Arias ^[1]

Afiliação do(s) autor(es)

^[1] Univ Fed Sao Paulo, Dept Social Sci, Estr Caminho Velho 333, BR-07252312 Sao Paulo - Brazil

• Tipo de documento: Artigo Científico
• Fonte: JOURNAL OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA; v. 13, n. 2, p. 243-268, AUG 2021.
• Citações Web of Science: 0

Resumo

In federations and other regionalised arrangements, the search for co-operation may lead to a hierarchical alignment where the centre concentrates policy decision-making power. The use of conditional grants to build this kind of co-ordination can disguise its rather coercive character when opt-out clauses are counteracted by fiscal constraints that virtually force subnational adherence. Previous accounts on recentralisation in Latin America have overlooked this feature, particularly by mistakenly identifying the transfer of fiscal resources and responsibilities with authority over policies. The article adopts a configurational approach, focused on mechanisms, to reassess two Brazilian programmes redesigned in the 1990s and 2000s - the Fundamental Education Fund (Fundef) and the Basic Health Care Programme (Programa de Atencao Basica, PAB). Our evidence shows that both reforms followed hierarchical paths and received massive adherence of municipalities. We discuss how this kind of coercion in disguise is especially concerning in settings where some retrenchment of social expenditure is expected. (AU)

• Processo FAPESP: 17/12677-6 - Gestão Descentralizada e Desigualdades Regionais nas Políticas de Educação e Saúde na Espanha: uma análise comparada com o Brasil
• Beneficiário: Daniel Arias Vazquez
• Modalidade de apoio: Bolsas no Exterior - Pesquisa
• Processo FAPESP: 18/10358-3 - Democratização desigual: federalismo e autonomia do eleitor na América Latina do século XX
• Beneficiário: Rogerio Schlegel
• Modalidade de apoio: Bolsas no Exterior - Pesquisa