Aristotle on Perception and Perception-like Appearance: De Anima 3.3, 428b10-29a9

Autor(es)

Keeling, Evan

• Tipo de documento: Artigo Científico
• Fonte: ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE; v. N/A, p. 26-pg., 2023-03-31.

Resumo

It is now common to explain some of incidental perception's features by means of a different capacity, called phantasia. Phantasia, usually translated as 'imagination,' is thought to explain how incidental perception can be false and representational by being a constitutive part of perception. Through a close reading of De Anima 3.3, 428b10-29a9, I argue against this and for perception first: phantasia is always a product of perception, from which it initially inherits all its characteristics. No feature of perception is explained directly by phantasia, and phantasia is never a part of perception. Phantasia is not imagination or representation, as many have thought, but perception-like appearance. Aristotle thus recognizes alongside three different types of perception three different types of perception-like appearance. (AU)

• Processo FAPESP: 20/15938-8 - As cores em Aristóteles
• Beneficiário: Evan Robert Keeling
• Modalidade de apoio: Bolsas no Exterior - Pesquisa
• Processo FAPESP: 16/11249-8 - Protágoras na Filosofia Grega Antiga
• Beneficiário: Evan Robert Keeling
• Modalidade de apoio: Bolsas no Exterior - Pesquisa