A logic for factive ignorance

Autor(es)

Kubyshkina, Ekaterina ^[1] ; Petrolo, Mattia ^[2]

Afiliação do(s) autor(es)

^[1] Univ Estadual Campinas, Ctr Log Epistemol & Hist Sci CLE, R Sergio Buarque de Holanda, 251 Cidade Univ, BR-13083859 Campinas, SP - Brazil

^[2] Fed Univ ABC UFABC, Ctr Nat & Human Sci CCNH, Alameda Univ S-N, BR-09606045 Sao Bernardo Do Campo, SP - Brazil

• Tipo de documento: Artigo Científico
• Fonte: SYNTHESE; v. 198, n. 6 OCT 2019.
• Citações Web of Science: 2

Resumo

In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance: the Standard View and the New View. The former defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the latter defines it as the absence of true belief. One of the main differences between these two positions lies in rejecting (Standard View) or in accepting (New View) the factivity of ignorance, i.e., if an agent is ignorant of phi, then phi is true. In the present article, we first provide a criticism of the Standard View in favour of the New View. Secondly, we propose a formal setting to represent the notion of factive ignorance. (AU)

• Processo FAPESP: 16/25891-3 - Arbitrariedade e genericidade: ou sobre como falar do indizível
• Beneficiário: Giorgio Venturi
• Modalidade de apoio: Auxílio à Pesquisa - Jovens Pesquisadores
• Processo FAPESP: 18/25501-6 - Análise epistemológica e lógica da noção de ignorância
• Beneficiário: Ekaterina Kubyshkina
• Modalidade de apoio: Bolsas no Brasil - Pós-Doutorado