| Full text | |
| Author(s): |
Total Authors: 2
|
| Affiliation: | [1] Univ Estadual Campinas, Ctr Log Epistemol & Hist Sci CLE, R Sergio Buarque de Holanda, 251 Cidade Univ, BR-13083859 Campinas, SP - Brazil
[2] Fed Univ ABC UFABC, Ctr Nat & Human Sci CCNH, Alameda Univ S-N, BR-09606045 Sao Bernardo Do Campo, SP - Brazil
Total Affiliations: 2
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| Document type: | Journal article |
| Source: | SYNTHESE; v. 198, n. 6 OCT 2019. |
| Web of Science Citations: | 2 |
| Abstract | |
In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance: the Standard View and the New View. The former defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the latter defines it as the absence of true belief. One of the main differences between these two positions lies in rejecting (Standard View) or in accepting (New View) the factivity of ignorance, i.e., if an agent is ignorant of phi, then phi is true. In the present article, we first provide a criticism of the Standard View in favour of the New View. Secondly, we propose a formal setting to represent the notion of factive ignorance. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 16/25891-3 - Arbitrariness and genericity: or on how to speak of the unspeakable |
| Grantee: | Giorgio Venturi |
| Support Opportunities: | Research Grants - Young Investigators Grants |
| FAPESP's process: | 18/25501-6 - Epistemological and logical analysis of the notion of ignorance |
| Grantee: | Ekaterina Kubyshkina |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Post-Doctoral |