Survey party loyalty in the city of Vinhedo: understand the motives in policy act of membership and disaffiliation (migration intraparty)

• Grant number: 13/00990-0
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Scientific Initiation
• Start date: April 01, 2013
• End date: December 31, 2013
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Political Science - Political Behavior
• Principal Investigator: Bruno Wilhelm Speck
• Grantee: Marcello Arturo Rigollet Penchiari
• Host Institution: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil

Abstract

This project consists in analyzing the behavior and motivations of party members, in relation to the act of affiliation with their current party, and disaffiliation, for membership (intraparty migration) or not others. Questionnaires will be - random selection of respondents - to the affiliated with the party's electoral district of Vinhedo, (25 registered parties, accounting for 6,433 members in the county) to evaluate the political history of each respondent. Expected to answer at least 50% of feedback regarding the questionnaire (250 fills). Pretenders will evaluate the relevance of party loyalties to the political careers of each member party respondent. The different frequencies in the intra-party transits observed will be defined to research, the cause will capture trends to the sedimentation of organizational loyalties or not. Having knowledge of the historical and political experience of each affiliate member, we can understand the motivations and situations prevailing - 1. Membership in the party and stay home 2. Partisan exchanges (migration to another), 3. Member affiliated with a party of one or more historically, intending to leave the political universe - are based on ideological or pragmatic intentions. In the theoretical argument, we will follow the line of authors (Mainwaring, 2005), that are pointing to electoral volatility as an indicator for recognizing low or high rates of institutionalization of a party system under a democratic regime. In parallel we will base the index of electoral volatility as being directly proportional to the volatility index of branch migration, indicating that the oscillation of party preference follows the same logic of electoral preference.(AU)