Size of Legislature, Public Spending and Political Budget Cycle

• Grant number: 15/22130-9
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Post-Doctoral
• Start date: March 01, 2016
• End date: February 28, 2018
• Field of knowledge: Applied Social Sciences - Economics
• Principal Investigator: Fabiana Fontes Rocha
• Grantee: Raphael Bottura Corbi
• Host Institution: Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade (FEA). Universidade de São Paulo (USP). São Paulo , SP, Brazil

Abstract

This research project intends to exploit a constitutional rule in Brazil that has beenenforced in the municipal elections in 2004 which sets limits to the number of municipalcouncillors according to local population. By exploring this exogenous change, I willbe able to causally identify that a decrease in the size of municipal legislature increasestotal spending over the subsequent mandate. In addition, further testing of competingpolitical economy theories will be performed based on the (potential) heterogeneity ofthe estimated effects. For instance, whether the exogenous increase takes place close toelections (consistent with political budget cycle theories); whether the extra spendingis observed on capital or current spending; and whether the effect is stronger/weakeraccording to the quality of municipal governance as measured by a proxy.

Scientific publications

(References retrieved automatically from Web of Science and SciELO through information on FAPESP grants and their corresponding numbers as mentioned in the publications by the authors)

CARVALHO, CRISTIANO C.; CORBI, RAPHAEL; NARITA, RENATA. Unintended consequences of unemployment insurance: Evidence from stricter eligibility criteria in Brazil. ECONOMICS LETTERS, v. 162, p. 157-161, JAN 2018. (15/22130-9)