The role of reference into metaphysical matters

• Grant number: 18/15705-3
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships abroad - Research Internship - Master's degree
• Start date: September 22, 2018
• End date: March 21, 2019
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - Epistemology
• Principal Investigator: Marco Antonio Caron Ruffino
• Grantee: Thainá Coltro Demartini
• Supervisor: Nathan Salmon
• Host Institution: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil
• Institution abroad: University of California, Santa Barbara (UC Santa Barbara), United States
• Associated to the scholarship: 16/25913-7 - Essentialism, modality and the direct reference theory, BP.MS

Abstract

In this project I deepen the analysis of the boundaries between Kripke's semantical theory and his essential theses - the topic of my FAPESP Masters' Project. In order to do so, I keep in mind the question: what (if any) notion of essence can be derived from Kripke's direct reference theory alone? There is an interpretation that stands by the ideia that the linguistic features highlighted by Kripke allow him to make metaphysical statements from a posteriori discoveries alone. On the opposite direction, there are some ways for one to defend that Kripke's metaphysical claims can only be sustained by metaphysical premisses (i.e., a priori statements) detached from the semantical theory itself. First, I intend to analyze in more depth what motivates the debate about the metaphysical import of Kripke's theory (1980). Second, I will focus on Salmon's argument (2005) against the reduction of metaphysical questions to language issues, followed by the exam of his constructive proposal of how else we could build Kripke's perspective without excluding the a priori role from the scheme. And, third, I intend to oppose Fine's proposal to Salmon's, and explain why an alternative such as Fine's can be attractive to our eyes. If any of the two can succeed in proposing a metaphysical premisse that fits into the picture of Kripke's theory as a whole, then we can maintain the notion of a priori philosophical analysis when deciding between essential and contingent properties of an object. On the other hand, if we can find any flaws in their interpretations, we cannot be so sure the traditional approach of a priori analyses is the best way to go. (AU)