Possibilities of reconciling the concept of mental representation between Enactivism and Active Inference

• Grant number: 23/14050-1
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Master
• Start date: June 01, 2024
• End date: September 30, 2025
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - Epistemology
• Principal Investigator: Osvaldo Frota Pessoa Junior
• Grantee: Paulo Duare Andrade Sayeg
• Host Institution: Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH). Universidade de São Paulo (USP). São Paulo , SP, Brazil

Abstract

A project of growing interest in the Philosophy of Cognitive Science is seeking to reconcile Enactivism with Active Inference. Several premises, theses and concepts from each perspective need to be articulated to form a coherent reconciliation. The field is divided between researchers who argue that it is possible to achieve reconciliation and those who argue that it is not possible to achieve it, maintaining that some premises, theses or concepts of Enactivism and Active Inference are incompatible. A particular case of incompatibility is the concept of mental representation, which appears in Active Inference and is rejected by enactivists. This research project proposes to analyze the possibilities of reconciling the concept of mental representation, used in Active Inference, with Enactivism. From this analysis, it is possible to raise potential problems in the search for conciliation if the mental representation in Active Inference is incompatible with Enactivism or, if they are compatible, to clarify what steps must be taken to achieve these searches. Therefore, the question of this project is the following: is it possible to reconcile the concept of mental representation present in Active Inference with enactivist principles? We have the general objectives of explaining the premises of both perspectives and evaluating whether there is any incompatibility in principle between mental representations in Active Inference and enactivist premises. Considering that the concept of mental representation is fundamental to Cognitive Science, this research offers good perspectives to help understand various issues associated with the nature of cognition and related philosophical questions.