The connection between demonstration and definition in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics

• Grant number: 24/04830-2
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships abroad - Research Internship - Doctorate
• Start date: August 01, 2024
• End date: January 15, 2025
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - History of Philosophy
• Principal Investigator: Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos
• Grantee: Mariane Farias de Oliveira
• Supervisor: Laura Maria Castelli
• Host Institution: Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH). Universidade de São Paulo (USP). São Paulo , SP, Brazil
• Institution abroad: University of Cambridge, England
• Associated to the scholarship: 21/01029-9 - The correlation between definition and demonstration in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, BP.DR

Abstract

The relationship between demonstration and definition in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics (APo) is our focus area in research. We have identified not just formal problems but also issues concerning how these practices (especially definitional ones) involve notions of investigation and scientific procedure that constitute pre-theoretical steps for their success. In APo B.1-2, when presenting the order of a scientific investigation, it is established that knowledge of the existence ("that it is") precedes knowledge of the essence ("what it is"). On the other hand, Aristotle states in B.8 that it is necessary to grasp something of the essence to know its existence and thus initiate an investigation. Thus, the main problem is that the inquiry would involve an apparent vicious circle: to know the essence is necessary to know the existence, and to know the existence, it is necessary to know, at least, something of the essence. Our central hypothesis is that "pre-scientific notions" allow us to overcome this apparent vicious circle. These notions establish, in the first moment, the existence of something.The research to be conducted at the University of Cambridge can be summarized in the following guiding question: What are pre-scientific notions, and how do they prove the species' existence to be defined? We aim to study the relationship between the means of proving the existence (an implicit notion in Aristotle) and pre-scientific notions. This relationship is based on the hypothesis that pre-scientific notions are the informational content of partial definitions, which appear in syllogistic arguments that justify the existence of attributes. Furthermore, we aim to provide a precise conception of "pre-scientific notion" to determine the nature of its contents (per se attributes, per se accidents, and propria), aiming to substantiate its role in justifying the existence of species and attributes.