Comparing Naturalisms: Quine, Hume and Dennett on the problem of how to make science of cognition

• Grant number: 24/17441-4
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Master
• Start date: May 01, 2025
• End date: February 28, 2027
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - Epistemology
• Principal Investigator: Silvio Seno Chibeni
• Grantee: Fernanda Caroliny Cardoso
• Host Institution: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil

Abstract

This project aims to investigate and compare how three different naturalized epistemologies-those of Willard Quine, David Hume, and Daniel Dennett-address the objectivity-subjectivity dichotomy. The centrality attributed to this dichotomy stems from its identification as the main underlying assumption in the problem of how to conduct a science of cognition, which can be characterized as the epistemological facet of the hard problem of consciousness. Thus, in pursuing this objective, the project seeks to outline the general contours of a naturalistic solution capable of integrating first-person and third-person perspectives into the problem of how to conduct a science of cognition. The project's hypothesis posits that by bridging the epistemological theories of these three philosophers, it is possible to preliminarily outline a naturalistic approach capable of robustly integrating the subjective perspective of cognition. This preserves the central problems of the classical tradition in the philosophy of mind while maintaining the naturalist assumptions regarding the epistemic priority of experience as the foundation of knowledge and the legitimacy of investigating cognition through methodologies typically employed in the empirical sciences.