Functionalism and Panprotopsychism in the Philosophy of Mind

• Grant number: 25/04579-0
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate
• Start date: August 01, 2025
• End date: July 31, 2029
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - Metaphysics
• Principal Investigator: Osvaldo Frota Pessoa Junior
• Grantee: João Felipe Santana Rasi
• Host Institution: Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH). Universidade de São Paulo (USP). São Paulo , SP, Brazil

Abstract

One of the fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind science is to satisfactorily understand the nature of our phenomenal consciousness, which involves both structural and qualitative aspects of our subjective mentality. The qualitative aspect, or qualia, poses conceptual and methodological challenges to our neuroscientific practice. Philosophical theories such as functionalism and panprotopsychism attempt to provide a conceptual framework to explain qualia. Functionalist theory understands mental states in terms of functional states that are independent of the material composition of the conscious system. Panprotopsychism, on the other hand, suggests that mentality arises from protomental properties that pervade all reality and, when combined in complex ways within organic bodies, give rise to consciousness as we know it. How these properties organize to generate mentality is a challenge for panprotopsychism, known as the combination problem. Based on this, the project aims to propose a dialogue between functionalism and panprotopsychism, specifically analyzing the combination problem of panprotopsychism through the lens of functionalist theory.