| Full text | |
| Author(s): |
Martone, Filipe
Total Authors: 1
|
| Document type: | Journal article |
| Source: | ANALYSIS; v. N/A, p. 9-pg., 2022-11-01. |
| Abstract | |
The issue of whether a theory of demonstratives should be able to handle Frege's Puzzle seems rather old hat, but it was not so much resolved as left hanging. This paper tries to remedy that. I argue that a major problem not previously noticed affects any theory of demonstratives that aims at dealing with Frege's Puzzle. This problem shows itself in cases in which the cognitive significance of a single demonstrative identity - such as 'that is that' - differs for participants of the same context. To accommodate such cases, I argue, we would need an implausible individualistic theory of demonstratives nobody should (or does) endorse. If so, we must look elsewhere for a solution to Frege's Puzzle. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 13/22364-4 - Semantics and cognitive value |
| Grantee: | Filipe Martone de Faria |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Master |