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Wittgenstein on Dreaming and Skepticism

Full text
Author(s):
Segatto, Antonio Ianni
Total Authors: 1
Document type: Journal article
Source: TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY; v. 41, n. 5, p. 10-pg., 2022-11-21.
Abstract

In this paper I aim to elucidate Wittgenstein's claim that the so-called dream argument is senseless. Unlike other interpreters, who understand the sentence "I am dreaming" as contradictory or self-defeating, I intend to elucidate in what sense one should understand it as senseless or, more precisely, as nonsensical. In this sense, I propose to understand the above-mentioned claim in light of Wittgenstein's criticism of skepticism from the Tractatus logico-philosophicus to his last writings. I intend to show that the words "I am dreaming" are nonsensical in the same sense as the alleged proposition "There are physical objects" or the expression of doubt about the existence of external objects. (AU)

FAPESP's process: 19/02290-2 - Wittgenstein and the practice of rule-following
Grantee:Antonio Ianni Segatto
Support Opportunities: Scholarships abroad - Research