Revisiting McKay and Johnson's counterexample to (beta)

Author(s)

Merlussi, Pedro

• Document type: Journal article
• Source: HILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION; v. 25, n. 2, p. 15-pg., 2022-02-27.

Abstract

In debates concerning the consequence argument, it has long been claimed that [McKay, T. J., and D. Johnson. 1996. "A Reconsideration of an Argument Against Compatibilism." Philosophical Topics 24 (2): 113-122] demonstrated the invalidity of rule (beta). Here, I argue that their result is not as robust as we might like to think. First, I argue that McKay and Johnson's counterexample is successful if one adopts a certain interpretation of 'no choice about' and if one is willing to deny the conditional excluded middle principle. In order to make this point I demonstrate that (beta) is valid on Stalnaker's theory of counterfactuals. This result is important and should not be neglected, I argue, because there is a particular line of objection to the revised formulations of the consequence argument that does not succeed against the original version. (AU)

• FAPESP's process: 17/20532-8 - Dispositional libertarianism: outline of a dispositional account of laws of nature and free will
• Grantee: Pedro Merlussi
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Post-Doctoral