An alternative approach for quasi-truth

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Author(s):	Coniglio, Marcelo Esteban ; da Cruz Silvestrini, Luiz Henrique Total Authors: 2
Document type:	Journal article
Source:	LOGIC JOURNAL OF THE IGPL; v. 22, n. 2, p. 24-pg., 2014-04-01.
Abstract
In 1986, Mikenberg et al. introduced the semantic notion of quasi-truth defined by means of partial structures. In such structures, the predicates are seen as triples of pairwise disjoint sets: the set of tuples which satisfies, does not satisfy and can satisfy or not the predicate, respectively. The syntactical counterpart of the logic of partial truth is a rather complicated first-order modal logic. In the present article, the notion of predicates as triples is recursively extended, in a natural way, to any complex formula of the first-order object language. From this, a new definition of quasi-truth is obtained. The proof-theoretic counterpart of the new semantics is a first-order paraconsistent logic whose propositional base is a 3-valued logic belonging to hierarchy of paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency, which was proposed by Carnielli and Marcos in 2002. (AU)

FAPESP's process:	10/51038-0 - Logical consequence, reasoning and computation - LOGCONS
Grantee:	Walter Alexandre Carnielli
Support Opportunities:	Research Projects - Thematic Grants