| Full text | |
| Author(s): |
Pugliese, Nastassja
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Journal article |
| Source: | BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY; v. 27, n. 4, p. 15-pg., 2019-07-04. |
| Abstract | |
In chapter IX of the Principles, Anne Conway claims that her metaphysics is diametrically opposed to those of Descartes and Spinoza. Scholars have analyzed her rejection of Cartesianism, but not her critique of Spinoza. This paper proposes that two central points of Conway's metaphysics can be understood as direct responses to Spinoza: (1) the relation between God, Christ, and the creatures in the tripartite division of being, and (2) the individuation of beings in the lowest species. I will argue that Conway, in criticizing Spinoza's identification between God and nature, defends a paradoxical monism, and that her concept of individuation is a reductio ad absurdum of Spinoza's criterion of identity in the individuation of finite modes. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 17/21722-5 - The Metaphysics of imagination in Spinoza: from the critique of non-being to the theory of ideas of imagination |
| Grantee: | Nastassja Saramago de Araujo Pugliese |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Post-Doctoral |