Frege's attempt to solve Russell's Paradox and its logical insufficiency
Wittgensteins Interpretation on Godels Incompleteness Theorem
Chemical characterization and antioxidant activity of nibs from wild cacao in the ...
Full text | |
Author(s): |
Nakano, Anderson
Total Authors: 1
|
Document type: | Journal article |
Source: | SYNTHESE; v. 199, n. 1-2, p. 18-pg., 2020-10-13. |
Abstract | |
In theFoundations of Mathematics(1925), Ramsey attempted to amendPrincipia Mathematica's logicism to meet serious objections raised against it. While Ramsey's paper is well known, some questions concerning Ramsey's motivations to write it and its reception still remain. This paper considers these questions afresh. First, an account is provided for why Ramsey decided to work on his paper instead of simply accepting Wittgenstein's account of mathematics as presented in theTractatus. Secondly, evidence is given supporting that Wittgenstein was not moved by Ramsey's objection against the Tractarian account of arithmetic, and a suggestion is made to explain why Wittgenstein reconsidered Ramsey's account in the early thirties on several occasions. Finally, a reading is formulated to understand the basis on which Wittgenstein argues against Ramsey's definition of identity in his 1927 letter to Ramsey. (AU) | |
FAPESP's process: | 15/25646-6 - WITTGENSTEIN'S REMARKS ON GÖDEL'S THEOREM |
Grantee: | Anderson Luis Nakano |
Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Post-Doctoral |