Politics beyond institutional design: Lobby supply and demand during the implementation of US trade agreements

• Grant number: 24/01500-1
• Support Opportunities: Regular Research Grants
• Start date: October 01, 2024
• End date: September 30, 2026
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Political Science - International Politics
• Principal Investigator: Rodrigo Fagundes Cezar
• Grantee: Rodrigo Fagundes Cezar
• Host Institution: Escola de Relações Internacionais. Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV). São Paulo , SP, Brazil

Abstract

This project aims to initiate a new research agenda that will generate and test hypotheses to explain when interest groups will lobby during the implementation of preferential trade agreements. The literature to date is largely focused on the design of trade agreements (i.e., the content of their clauses), but says very little about how lobbying is done after these treaties are approved, when their institutional design is already set. This is an important gap, as trade agreements are incomplete contracts and often their clauses are vague. Thus, how these clauses will be implemented can impact the effects of these agreements. The project will categorize and classify in an automated manner a database of lobbying with about 5 million lines from 1999-2022. The project will deliver three main products: a database, a literature review article aimed at the Brazilian public, and a main article using instrumental variables regressions published in a top-tier journal in the fields of International Relations and Political Science. The project aims to open new doors for a research agenda with high potential for impact, initiated by a young Brazilian researcher, based in São Paulo, and grounded in a clear gap that exists in the field. At a time when new trade agreements are becoming increasingly complex, the project also helps to project the scientific and public policy challenges for integration into the global economy. (AU)