The intentionality as essential property of mind

• Grant number: 11/22104-7
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Scientific Initiation
• Start date: April 01, 2012
• End date: November 30, 2013
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Psychology - Fundamentals and Assessments in Psychology
• Principal Investigator: Jonas Gonçalves Coelho
• Grantee: Paulo Uzai Junior
• Host Institution: Faculdade de Ciências (FC). Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP). Campus de Bauru. Bauru , SP, Brazil

Abstract

We intend to investigate the use of the notion of intentionality as distinctive property of the mind. Starting with Franz Brentano ideas of intentionality we will investigate the view of the contemporary philosopher of mind John Searle analyzing in special his definition of intentionality, the basic forms of intentionality and the relations between intentionality and language, intentionality and background and intentionality and brain. We will analyze the Searle's position regarding to the contemporary philosophers who consider the notion of intentionality under a reductionist or eliminativist materialist perspective. Finally, returning to the comparison with Brentano, we will reflect on the implications of the Searle's approach to the psychology, in other words, analyze if the notion of intentionality implies the difference in nature between the mind and the physical and if the establishment of this difference implies the irreducibility of the mind and the inadequacy of the method of the natural sciences to address the mind. (AU)