Legislative behavior and foreign policy in governments Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (1995-2010)

• Grant number: 13/12027-0
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships abroad - Research
• Start date: November 01, 2013
• End date: February 28, 2014
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Political Science - Political Behavior
• Principal Investigator: Simone Diniz
• Grantee: Simone Diniz
• Host Investigator: Timothy J. Power
• Host Institution: Centro de Engenharia, Modelagem e Ciências Sociais Aplicadas (CECS). Universidade Federal do ABC (UFABC). Ministério da Educação (Brasil). Santo André , SP, Brazil
• Institution abroad: University of Oxford, England

Abstract

The objective of this proposal is to analyze the performance of the deputies in the formulation and deliberation of policies related to external issue during the administrations of Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The research is part of a debate that links congressional action and foreign policy, arguing that changes resulting from ongoing changes in international relations resonate domestically. Thus, in a democratic context, nothing more legitimate and perhaps necessary, that our representatives include in their agenda the issues of foreign policy. In this light, here I adopt the view that foreign policy is just another "public policy" and as such, subject to conflicts and political disputes. It is, therefore, a "public policy" that can be used in the analysis of legislative behavior and interactions between the executive and legislative branches. Will be examined 1) how the Presidency and the deputies interact on a set of issues that require legislative approval and that go beyond the cases of adoption of international acts in a context where the political system operates under coalition governments. This approach will check which model of the type of "reactive legislature" Cox and Morgenstern fits the Brazilian case. Moreover, you can also check for variation of legislative behavior within the same country, if legislatures acted either constructively to the development of policies, or as institutional veto players. If so, whether this variation can be explained by the type of party coalition that was assembled in each presidential administrations, 2) the performance of the deputies in the process of policymaking ordinary laws (includes both the laws made by the legislature and by the Executive) related to external issues. The interest is theoretical and analytical dialogue with the typology proposed by Cox and Morgenstern (2002) to evaluate the applicability of the term "legislature reactive" to the Brazilian case and the literature assumes that the Legislature, to be originating from a local electorate, have no interest in so-called national policies. The study will investigate, by means of propositions on foreign policy, as lawmakers behaved during the two presidential administrations and test the validity of the hypothesis that foreign policy - not surrender vote - not mobilize parliamentarians in Brazil. Finally, one central question that will permeate the entire work is if there was variation in the performance of parliamentary deliberation and formulation of policies. If so, what explains this variation? The research will be carried out in two steps: 1) update of the international and national literature on the subject, 2) assembling a database of ordinary legislation approved on foreign policy. Constitute the empirical material of this study ordinary laws approved during the administrations of Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (1995-2010), available at www.presidencia.gov.br and www.camara.gov.br respectively . Laws were chosen because they are one of the instruments that generate public policies and therefore, require congressional deliberation. Moreover, it is a kind of legislative proposal that gives lawmakers greater leeway because there is no constitutional restrictions to amendmenting, for example. This is a qualitative analysis, mapping, and management issues for presidential, which was produced in terms of ordinary legislation related to foreign policy and how they behaved federal deputies in the process of deliberation, in order to identify whether or not conflicts of interest in the executive and legislative branches, distinguishing the actions of members of the coalition supporting the government and the opposition. (AU)