Equilibrium selection in dynamic environments with heterogeneity

• Grant number: 14/06069-5
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships abroad - Research Internship - Doctorate
• Start date: August 01, 2014
• End date: July 31, 2015
• Field of knowledge: Applied Social Sciences - Economics - Economic Theory
• Principal Investigator: Bernardo de Vasconcellos Guimaraes
• Grantee: Ana Elisa Gonçalves Pereira
• Supervisor: Itay Goldstein
• Host Institution: Escola de Economia de São Paulo (EESP). Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV). São Paulo , SP, Brazil
• Institution abroad: University of Pennsylvania, United States
• Associated to the scholarship: 13/24368-7 - iPhone or Android? Equilibrium selection in dynamic models with network externalities, BP.DR

Abstract

This work is devoted to study equilibrium selection in dynamic games with strategiccomplementarities in which players have heterogeneous preferences. This kind ofgames can be applied to the study of many circumstances in economics, e.g., models ofnetworks externalities, technological standards adoption, competition among platformsin two-sided markets, among others. However, these games usually present multipleequilibria, making it difficult to derive predictions or make comparative statics withoutrelying on ad hoc assumptions concerning which equilibrium will be played. Thus, theapplied literature can benefit from the theoretical results from this research. (AU)

Scientific publications

(References retrieved automatically from Web of Science and SciELO through information on FAPESP grants and their corresponding numbers as mentioned in the publications by the authors)

GUIMARAES, BERNARDO; ELISA PEREIRA, ANA. Dynamic coordination among heterogeneous agents. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, v. 73, p. 13-33, DEC 2017. (14/06069-5, 13/24368-7)

GUIMARAES, BERNARDO; PEREIRA, ANA ELISA. QWERTY is efficient. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, v. 163, p. 819-825, MAY 2016. (14/06069-5, 13/24368-7)