Causation, dispositions and metaphysical necessity: a study on the modality of causal/dispositional events

• Grant number: 14/04701-6
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Master
• Start date: August 01, 2014
• End date: March 31, 2016
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - Metaphysics
• Agreement: Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES)
• Principal Investigator: Marco Antonio Caron Ruffino
• Grantee: Matheus Valente Leite
• Host Institution: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil
• Associated scholarship(s): 15/11666-5 - Semantic Relationism, Fregeanism and non-transitivity: a comparative study, BE.EP.MS

Abstract

This work intends to investigate the modal nature of causal/dispositional events. More specifically, its objective is to comprehend which modality relates a cause and its effect. Usually it is conceived that the instantiation of a cause is a sufficient condition for the instantiation of its effect. This gives rise to the following thesis: the ocurrence of a cause necessitates the ocurrence of its effect. We'll call this thesis causal necessitarianism. It represents the intuitive idea that we can necessarily imply an effect through its cause. Explicitly or implicitly, this thesis has been assumed by any theory that pressuposes a relation of metaphysical necessity between the instantiation of a cause and its effect [such as the counterfactual analyses of Lewis (1997) and Choi (2008)]. On the other side of the river, authors such as Schrenk (2010) and Mumford & Anjum (2011) have proposed the rejection of causal necessitarianism. Their objective is to break apart the concepts of necessity and causal events - substituting the first for a new modal concept, primitive and irreducible to others: the dispositional modality. Comparing these two theories, the present work intends to emphasize its pros and cons - mainly through the benefits they could bring to other philosophical questions; at the end it should have been decided which theory is philosophically more rewarding. (AU)

Academic Publications

(References retrieved automatically from State of São Paulo Research Institutions)

LEITE, Matheus Valente. Conteúdo singular e correferência de jure. 2016. Master's Dissertation - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas Campinas, SP.