Semantic Relationism, Fregeanism and non-transitivity: a comparative study

• Grant number: 15/11666-5
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships abroad - Research Internship - Master's degree
• Start date: August 25, 2015
• End date: February 24, 2016
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy
• Principal Investigator: Marco Antonio Caron Ruffino
• Grantee: Matheus Valente Leite
• Supervisor: Kit Fine
• Host Institution: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil
• Institution abroad: New York University, United States
• Associated to the scholarship: 14/04701-6 - Causation, dispositions and metaphysical necessity: a study on the modality of causal/dispositional events, BP.MS

Abstract

Our research will be concerned with assessing how well can a Fregean about linguistic and mental content answer the threats posed to his theory by that of the Semantic Relationist. More particularly, we will focus on Chalmers' epistemic two-dimensionalist theory and the kinds of answers he could give both to Kit Fine's and Pinillos' arguments for the non-transitivity of de jure coreference, the type of strict sameness of reference exhibited by two token expressions that are apriori co-referent, e.g. the two token names in 'Hesperus is Hesperus'. According to those arguments, to make sense of people samesaying by means of de jure coreference in different discourses (Fine(2009)) or even in the same discourse (Pinillos(2011)), one needs a semantic notion which is not transitive, so that one token expression a may be apriori co-referent with a token expression b, b with c, but a not apriori co-referent with c. This is problematic for the Fregean because his most obvious strategy for characterizing de jure co-reference between two expressions is associating them with the same Sense; but identity is an equivalence relation, thus, necessarily transitive. We intend to get deeper on these issues through rehearsing possible replies on behalf of the Fregean.