Semantics and cognitive value

• Grant number: 14/11895-1
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships abroad - Research Internship - Master's degree
• Start date: September 01, 2014
• End date: December 31, 2014
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy
• Principal Investigator: Marco Antonio Caron Ruffino
• Grantee: Filipe Martone de Faria
• Supervisor: Nathan Salmon
• Host Institution: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil
• Institution abroad: University of California, Santa Barbara (UC Santa Barbara), United States
• Associated to the scholarship: 13/22364-4 - Semantics and cognitive value, BP.MS

Abstract

This research is part of a larger investigation concerning Howard Wettstein's arguments against the idea that semantic theories should explain cognitive significance. As he points out, many anti-Fregeans are still working under Fregean assumptions: they think that any semantic theory must deal with Frege's puzzle in its various forms. I have three main objectives here. First, I intend to examine Frege's puzzle more deeply. An investigation of what is involved in this puzzle can clarify why it became so important to the philosophy of language and why it seems to be so pressing to answer it. Second, I will focus on the notion of character, which is often invoked in order to deal with the problem of cognitive significance. Despite its initial appeal, several counter-examples seem to show that character is not capable of explaining the informativeness of some utterances. This needs to be explained. Third and finally, I should examine reflexive content, a more promising candidate for explaining cognitive significance. However, this idea also has its share of problems. If both character and reflexive content fail to account for Frege's puzzle, it would be reasonable to conclude that Wettstein's criticism is correct and that semantics should not worry about the cognitive dimension of language. (AU)