Evaluation of the enactivist view through the analysis of problems in the Philosophy of Mind

• Grant number: 14/03029-2
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate
• Start date: August 01, 2014
• End date: April 02, 2019
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy
• Agreement: Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES)
• Principal Investigator: Marco Antonio Caron Ruffino
• Grantee: Laura Machado Do Nascimento
• Host Institution: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil
• Associated scholarship(s): 16/20284-1 - Radical enactive cognition: how to account for the phenomenal aspects of consciousness, BE.EP.DR

Abstract

This project aims to evaluate the enactivist view of mind, by comparing it to views of mind that were developed over the last century. The enactivist approach, proposed by Varela, Thompson e Rosch (1993), Thompson (2007), O'Regan e Noë (2001), Noë (2004, 2009), among others, questions the assumptions of traditional views of mind, such as computational views of mind (Fodor, 1983, 1984, 1985; Pylyshyn, 1980, 1999) and materialistic views of mind (Churchland, 1981, 1988; Churchland, 1986; Churchland and Sejnowski, 1990). According to the enactivist approach, hard solving problems of Philosophy of Mind, such as consciousness related problems, arise as consequences of inadequate and unquestioned assumptions made by philosophical and scientific research. By analyzing problems such as the problem of qualia (Jackson, 1982, 1986), the problem of the explanatory gap (Levine, 1983) and the "hard problem of consciousness" (Chalmers, 1995), we aim to evaluate the plausibility of the enactivist approach. (AU)

Academic Publications

(References retrieved automatically from State of São Paulo Research Institutions)

NASCIMENTO, Laura Machado Do. Como é ser um enativista. 2020. Doctoral Thesis - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas Campinas, SP.