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| Author(s): |
Laura Machado do Nascimento
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Doctoral Thesis |
| Press: | Campinas, SP. |
| Institution: | Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas |
| Defense date: | 2020-02-18 |
| Examining board members: |
Marco Ruffino;
Rogério Passos Severo;
Emiliano Boccardi;
Ludovic Soutif;
Nara Miranda de Figueiredo
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| Advisor: | Marco Ruffino |
| Abstract | |
Explaining mental phenomena has been a permanent challenge for both scientists and philosophers. This thesis provides reasons to consider Enactivism, specially in its radical variants, as an approach able to fruitfully frame mental phenomena. For enactivists, not only the brain, but the whole body, the environment and the biological history, both in the phylogenetic and the ontogenetic levels, besides social and cultural aspects are necessary for an adequate understanding of cognition. In addition to presenting the main tenets of Enactivism (chapters 1 and 2), I argue that the standard ways according to which phenomenality has been traditionally understood face shortcomings which derive from misleading philosophical assumptions. More specifically, the deep difficulties in scientifically explaining phenomenality stem from implicit reductive expectations in philosophical and scientific research about the mind (chapter 3) and from a distorted conception of experience (chapter 4). As a conclusion, I indicate that an enactivist inspired view for phenomenality is not only possible, but in fact a promising approach for mind and cognition (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 14/03029-2 - Evaluation of the enactivist view through the analysis of problems in the Philosophy of Mind |
| Grantee: | Laura Machado Do Nascimento |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate |