Skepticism and The First Person

• Grant number: 16/03277-1
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Post-Doctoral
• Start date: June 01, 2016
• End date: December 09, 2018
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - Epistemology
• Principal Investigator: Marco Antonio Caron Ruffino
• Grantee: Joshua Rowan Thorpe
• Host Institution: Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência (CLE). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil
• Associated scholarship(s): 17/10221-5 - Scepticism and Self Knowledge, BE.EP.PD

Abstract

In one of its forms, scepticism is the position that I, or perhaps we, do not have any empirical knowledge. Compelling arguments for this seemingly unacceptable claim present one of the central problems in both historical and contemporary philosophy. It may seem to be merely a stylistic matter whether the sceptical position is formulated in the first-person (singular or plural), as above, or in the third-person. Thus, many contemporary philosophers say that scepticism is the position that some particular subject, S, or perhaps a group of subjects, G, do not have any empirical knowledge. Other contemporary philosophers do formulate the sceptical position in the first-person, but believe that they might just as well have formulated it in the third-person. The primary aim of my research project is to argue that it is not merely a stylistic matter whether the sceptical claim is formulated in the first or the third-person; on the contrary, scepticism is essentially first-personal. By this I mean that scepticism must be formulated in the first-person if it is to present a compelling philosophical problem. From this many consequences follow regarding our understanding both of why scepticism arises, and of what is required of an adequate response to scepticism.

Scientific publications

(References retrieved automatically from Web of Science and SciELO through information on FAPESP grants and their corresponding numbers as mentioned in the publications by the authors)

THORPE, JOSHUA ROWAN. Radical interpretation, scepticism, and the possibility of shared error. SYNTHESE, v. 196, n. 8, p. 14-pg., 2019-08-01. (16/03277-1)

THORPE, JOSHUA ROWAN. Radical interpretation, scepticism, and the possibility of shared error. SYNTHESE, v. 196, n. 8, SI, p. 3355-3368, AUG 2019. (16/03277-1)

THORPE, JOSHUA ROWAN. Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument. PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, v. 176, n. 9, p. 2289-2306, SEP 2019. (16/03277-1)