The notion of content and Frege's logical objects

• Grant number: 16/15742-0
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships abroad - Research Internship - Doctorate
• Start date: February 02, 2017
• End date: August 01, 2017
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - Logic
• Principal Investigator: Marco Antonio Caron Ruffino
• Grantee: Vincenzo Ciccarelli
• Supervisor: Agustin Rayo
• Host Institution: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil
• Institution abroad: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), United States
• Associated to the scholarship: 14/27057-5 - Foundations and principles of Frege's logical objects, BP.DR

Abstract

In this project I deepen my analysis of the notion of logical object which is the main topic of my FAPESP PhD project. In particular, I refer to Frege's notion of 'content' and I highlight the fundamental role it plays in the foundation and principles that rule the introduction of logical objects into the formal system. My proposal is to introduce a weak notion of content which although on the one hand is not aimed at entirely solving the problem of indeterminacy of reference for terms allegedly referring to logical objects, on the other hand may have the advantage of being generally characterized in the framework of a Fregean semantic theory and of providing a partial justification for Axiom V and Hume's principle. I also highlight the aspects in which my proposal is strongly connected with my local supervisor's work and with other faculty members. (AU)