Justification of induction and inductive belief: a discussion of Howson on Hume

• Grant number: 16/25125-9
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships abroad - Research Internship - Master's degree
• Start date: April 01, 2017
• End date: May 31, 2017
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - History of Philosophy
• Principal Investigator: Marcos Antonio Alves
• Grantee: Pedro Bravo de Souza
• Supervisor: Eleonore Le Jalle
• Host Institution: Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências (FFC). Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP). Campus de Marília. Marília , SP, Brazil
• Institution abroad: Université Charles de Gaulle - Lille 3, France
• Associated to the scholarship: 16/03251-2 - Bayesianism and the problem of induction: a critical investigation on Colin Howson's approach, BP.MS

Abstract

In Hume's problem, the contemporary philosopher Colin Howson tries to solve the problem of induction established by David Hume through his bayesian approach. Before, however, to assess whether this is indeed the case, it would not only be pertinent to analyze how Howson understands the problem of induction, but above all the roles that the Scottish philosopher assumes in his book. Thus, the purpose of this research internship project is to critically analyze Howson's comments about Hume. In order to attain it, it is divided into two specific objectives: (i) to verify whether Hume has, as Howson says, assumed an independent assumption in inductive reasoning; and (ii) to better understand the humean passages on the justification of induction as well as those on the nature of inductive belief to ascertain, first, whether Howson neglects them and, then, to better analyze how Hume establishes differences between beliefs and fictitious ideas. It is believed that such an analysis is necessary for us to discuss later the hypothesis that bayesianism can solve the problem of induction. (AU)