Scepticism and Self Knowledge

• Grant number: 17/10221-5
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships abroad - Research Internship - Post-doctor
• Start date: August 01, 2017
• End date: July 31, 2018
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - Epistemology
• Principal Investigator: Marco Antonio Caron Ruffino
• Grantee: Joshua Rowan Thorpe
• Supervisor: Crispin James Garth Wright
• Host Institution: Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência (CLE). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil
• Institution abroad: University of Stirling, Scotland
• Associated to the scholarship: 16/03277-1 - Skepticism and The First Person, BP.PD

Abstract

Let us say that scepticism about a topic is the view that I do not know anything about that topic. In philosophy, discussion of scepticism has tended to focus on scepticism regarding my knowledge of the external world, that is, the world of physical objects. There is very little discussion of scepticism regarding my knowledge of my internal world, that is, the world of my own mental states. For example, whilst we find much discussion in philosophy of whether I know that I have hands, we find very little discussion of whether I know that I believe that I have hands, or whether I know that it appears to me as if I have hands. This research project focuses on the question of whether it is possible to motivate scepticism regarding my knowledge of my internal world. The question is approached by an investigation of the epistemically distinct nature of my self-knowledge, that is, my first-person knowledge of my internal world. An answer to the question of whether it is possible to motivate scepticism regarding my knowledge of my internal world will have implications for what is required from an adequate response to scepticism, and for the debate about the nature of self-knowledge.