Conceptual capacities and the function of judgments: McDowell's new reading on Kant and the implications for his current view on the philosophical nature of perceptual experience

• Grant number: 24/01536-6
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships abroad - Research Internship - Post-doctor
• Start date: October 01, 2024
• End date: September 30, 2025
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - Epistemology
• Principal Investigator: João Vergílio Gallerani Cuter
• Grantee: Daniel Mendes Campos Xavier Debarry
• Supervisor: Andrea Kern
• Host Institution: Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH). Universidade de São Paulo (USP). São Paulo , SP, Brazil
• Institution abroad: Leipzig University, Germany
• Associated to the scholarship: 22/14083-4 - 'The fundamental problem of perception': McDowell and Travis on the philosophical nature of perceptual experience., BP.PD

Abstract

The general aim of this post-doctoral research is to offer possible ways of answering what Charles Travis, in the context of the ongoing "Travis-McDowell Debate", labels "The fundamental problem of perception": according to him, the matter of "how perception can make the world bear for us on the thing to think". In a broad sense, the exchange between McDowell and Travis offers opposing answers to the following question: could conceptual capacities be actualized in perceptual experience itself, not only in perceptual judgments? This particular proposal intends, in the context of a search on Kant for answers to problems typically addressed by the analytic tradition, to contribute to the debate. Somewhat in line with the so-called "Pittsburgh School of Philosophy" as well as the "FAGI" (Forschungskolleg Analytic German Idealism), we propose to follow the steps taken by people such as John McDowell and Andrea Kern (among others), who seek to explore the relationship between thought, language, and experience not only from ideas found in the work of analytic philosophers such as Frege, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Travis (to name a few) but also through the lenses of thinkers traditionally foreign to the analytic tradition, such as Kant. Hence, we intend (i) to address the issue of how perception and perceptual judgments are related to each other and (ii) to offer a middle ground to the Travis-McDowell Debate. To do so, we propose to develop a Kantian-inspired thesis within a contemporary framework. Finally, we hope to accommodate some of Travis's objections without giving up McDowell's insight that perception involves conceptual capacities.