Kant’s logic and its ontological presuppositions

• Grant number: 12/10772-8
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships abroad - Research
• Start date: September 10, 2012
• End date: September 09, 2013
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - History of Philosophy
• Principal Investigator: Luciano Nervo Codato
• Grantee: Luciano Nervo Codato
• Host Investigator: Desmond Hogan
• Host Institution: Escola de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (EFLCH). Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP). Campus Guarulhos. Guarulhos , SP, Brazil
• Institution abroad: Princeton University, United States

Abstract

How should we understand the origins of the distinction between philosophy and science, whose conceptual formulation is usually attributed to Kant? Considering the theoretical use of reason, in view of the impossibility of theology, cosmology and psychology, on the one hand, and the reality of mathematics and physics, on the other, which epistemological status does the Critique of Pure Reason assigns to ontology, understood as Hauptwissenschaft or first philosophy? Instead of claiming the end of any possible ontology, would not be more appropriate to Kant's account of judgment to admit the end of an ontology which reduces phaenomena to noumena, Sinnenwesen to Verstandeswesen? Against neo-Kantians readings of the CPR, we intend to show that what theologians mean by God becomes the logical and ontological space that allows us to judge, the transcendental condition of thinking and being as well. This assumption leads to the question: which ontotheology should be consistent with the Kantian critique of reason? Which anti-dogmatical conception of the ens realissimum could transform God in a necessary presupposition not only of the Critique of Practical Reason, but also of the Critique of Judgment? (AU)